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Executive	  Summary	  	  	  With	  the	  sponsorship	  of	  the	  National	  Nuclear	  Security	  Administration	  (NNSA),	  the	  Center	  on	   Contemporary	   Conflict	   (CCC)	   at	   the	   Naval	   Postgraduate	   School	   (NPS)	   convened	   the	  2014	   Battlefield	   Nuclear	   Weapons	   and	   Deterrence	   Strategies:	   Phase	   III	   workshop.	   This	  event	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	   the	  professional	  engagement	  between	  former	  senior	  military	  officials	   and	   leading	   security	   experts	   from	   Pakistan,	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   the	   United	  Kingdom.	   This	   Battlefield	   Nuclear	   Weapons	   series	   of	   workshops	   has	   focused	   on	   the	  implications	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  short-­‐range	  nuclear	  weapons,	  also	  known	  as	  battlefield	  or	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  TNW),	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  	  In	  this	  workshop,	  participants	  were	  expected	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  threads	  of	  previous	  iterations	  of	  this	  project	  and	  apply	  those	  discussions	  to	  analyze	  the	  strategic,	  operational,	  and	  tactical	  dynamics	  in	  Europe	  between	  NATO	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Participants	  also	   examined	   the	   applicability	   and	   relevancy	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   experience	   to	   South	  Asia.	  Workshop	  participants	  conducted	  a	  staff	  ride	  of	   the	  Fulda	  Gap,	  discussed	  the	  operational	  and	   tactical	  dimensions	  of	   the	   Inner	  German	  Border	   (IGB),	  and	  engaged	   in	  presentations	  and	  discussions	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  better	  understanding	  the	  implications	  of	  employment	  and	  deployment	  of	  battlefield	  nuclear	  weapons,	   the	  challenges	  military	  planners	   faced	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  what	  lessons	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  	  The	   Pakistani	   rationale	   for	  TNW	   is	   that	   these	   weapons	  are	   an	   insurance	   policy	  against	   surprise	   and	   a	  guarantee	   at	   the	   operational	  level;	   in	   their	  view,	  TNW	  will	  buy	   time	   against	   a	   strategic	  defeat.	   Throughout	   the	  workshop,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  challenging	  elements	  for	  both	  sides	   was	   the	   persistent	   lack	  of	   clarity	   over	   when	   and	  where	   exactly	   the	   Americans	  would	   have	   used	   their	   TNW	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  Warsaw	  Pact	  invasion.	   The	   American	   team	  suggested	   it	   was	   entirely	  possible	   that	   TNW	   would	  never	  have	  been	  used,	  given	  the	  difficulties	  in	  achieving	  release	  authority	  and	  then	  moving	  the	   weapons	   into	   position.	   The	   Pakistani	   military	   professionals	   were	   cognizant	   of	   the	  NATO/	  Warsaw	  Pact	  operational	  conditions	  and	  were	  intuitively	  comparing	  the	  American	  dilemma	  with	  their	  own.	  They	  felt	  that	  the	  repeated	  American	  response	  of	  “not	  here”	  and	  “not	  yet”	  would	  provide	  too	  much	  time	  and	  space	  to	  the	  advancing	  Warsaw	  Pact	  forces.	  In	  their	  minds,	   delaying	   the	   deployment	   of	   TNW	  would	   have	   diluted	   the	   desired	   deterrent	  effect	   on	   invading	   conventional	   forces.	   They	   also	   recognized,	   however,	   that	   rapid	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deployment	   would	   not	   only	   change	   the	   battlefield	   dynamics	   but	   also	   force	   premature	  employment	  choices.	  For	  Pakistan,	   there	   is	   little	  battlefield	  space	   to	  be	   traded	  before	   the	  questions	   of	   deployment	   and	   employment	   of	  TNW	  must	   be	   answered	  definitively.	   These	  responses	  generated	  substantial	  discussion	  of	  NATO	  warfighting	  concept	  at	  the	  IGB	  and	  the	  relevant	  analogy	  for	  South	  Asia.	  	  	  The	   Fulda	   Gap	   staff	   ride	   showed	   that	   it	   was	   the	   revolution	   in	   conventional	   military	  technology,	  not	  TNW,	  which	  eventually	  solved	  NATO’s	  dilemma	  to	  use	  or	  not	  use	  TNW	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact.	  When	   the	  nuclear	  euphoria	  of	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  wore	  off,	   the	  U.S.	   Army	   realized	   the	   battlefield	   nuclear	   systems	   being	   delivered	   consumed	   significant	  resources	  in	  their	  maintenance	  and	  protection,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  militarily	  and	  politically	  problematic.	   The	   revolution	   in	  military	   affairs	   of	   the	   1980s	   provided	   better	   solutions	   at	  lower	  costs,	  both	  financial	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  manpower	  and	  logistical	  support.	  Furthermore,	  because	   advanced	   conventional	   munitions	   could	   potentially	   be	   used	   without	   tripping	   a	  nuclear	  wire,	  they	  provided	  a	  greater	  deterrent	  value	  against	  lower-­‐level	  adventurism.	  	  	  The	   Pakistani	   participants	   appreciated	   this	   history;	   however,	   given	   Pakistan’s	   limited	  resources,	  they	  wondered	  if	  Pakistan	  could	  afford	  the	  necessary	  conventional	  technological	  improvements	   that	  would	  deter	  an	   Indian	  Army	  equipped	  with	  21st	   century	  armaments.	  While	   Pakistani	   participants	   argued	   they	   have	   reached	   a	   new	   maturity	   with	   regard	   to	  nuclear	  weapons	  doctrines,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  offer	  solutions	  to	  the	  Goldilocks	  dilemma	  posed	   by	   TNW.	   Pakistani	   assumptions	   surrounding	   the	   perceived	   value	   of	   TNWs	   as	  deterrent	   weapons	   are	   debatable;	   does	   Nasr	   really	   throw	   cold	   water	   on	   Cold	   Start?	  Furthermore,	   as	   NATO	   experienced,	   there	   are	   complex	   challenges	   inherent	   in	   the	  integration	   of	   TNW	   into	  war-­‐fighting	   plans,	   notwithstanding	   the	   friction	   and	   fog	   of	  war.	  	  Plans	  made	  during	  peacetime	  would	  meet	  unforeseen	  obstacles	  in	  the	  battle	  environment,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  effective	  deployment	  and	  employment	  of	  TNW.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  no	  clarity	   on	   questions	   of	   articulation	   of	   command	   and	   control,	   battle-­‐space	   management,	  field	   security	   problems,	   and	   the	   probability	   that	   India	   would	   preemptively	   attack	   the	  weapons	   systems	   once	   they	   have	   been	   flushed	   out	   of	   peacetime	   storage.	   Pakistani	  participants	   admitted	   they	   are	   still	   on	   the	   learning	   curve	   but	   blamed	   India’s	   military	  doctrine	  of	   limited	  war	  (Cold	  Start)	  for	  forcing	  Pakistan	  to	  introduce	  battlefield	  deterrent	  weapons.	  	  The	  workshop	  reinforced	  the	  four	  primary	  disjunctures	  between	  the	  Cold	  War	  experience	  and	   South	   Asia	   environment	   that	   were	   delineated	   in	   the	   concept	   paper	   for	   this	   project.	  First,	  alliance	  politics	  were	  critically	   important	  in	  the	  nuclear	  dimension	  of	  the	  Cold	  War;	  this	  is	  obviously	  not	  an	  issue	  in	  Pakistan.	  Furthermore,	  nuclear	  use	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  would	  have	  been	  on	  German	  territory,	  not	  American,	  which	  carries	  a	  different	  weight	  for	  decision	  makers.	   Pakistan,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   would	   consider	   nuclear	   use	   on	   its	   own	   territory.	  Thirdly,	   Cold	  War	   actors	   did	   not	   face	   nearly	   as	   complex	   and	   active	   a	   sub-­‐national	   actor	  problem	  that	  the	  South	  Asian	  states	  must	  cope	  with.	  Finally,	  the	  problem	  of	  cyber	  warfare	  was	  not	  nearly	  as	  acute	  as	  it	  is	  today.	  	  The	   above	   differences	   notwithstanding,	   the	   Pakistani	   participants	   grasped	   the	  NATO/Warsaw	   Pact	   correlation	   and	   were	   able	   to	   explain	   how	   and	   why	   the	   Pakistani	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geography	   did	   not	   allow	   the	   luxury	   of	   giving	   30–50km	   of	   territory	   in	   some	   critical	  operation	  areas	  before	  resorting	  to	  TNW.	  In	  areas	  where	  the	  lines	  of	  communication	  were	  perilously	  close	  to	  the	  border—such	  as	   in	  the	  heartland	  in	  Punjab—the	  scope	  for	  trading	  space	  would	  be	  very	   limited;	  Pakistan	  must	   stop	  any	   Indian	   incursion	  at	   the	  border	  as	  a	  matter	   of	   both	   national	   pride	   and	   military	   necessity.	   Pakistani	   participants,	   however,	  conceded	   that	   some	   degree	   of	   territorial	   loss	   against	   advancing	   mechanized	   forces	   was	  possible	   in	   the	   desert	   sector	   in	   South	   Asia.	   They	   also	   noted,	   however,	   that	   operational	  conditions	  in	  the	  South	  Asian	  desert	  environment	  are	  obviously	  much	  different	  compared	  to	  the	  rolling	  terrain	  in	  the	  Fulda	  Gap	  region.1	  	  	  In	   the	   closing	   session,	   Pakistani	   participants	   expressed	   a	   much	   deeper	   sense	   of	  appreciation	  of	   the	  American	  Cold	  War	   experience.	  Despite	   the	   sui	   generis	   nature	  of	   the	  American	   experience	   in	  Germany,	   the	  Pakistani	   generals	   acknowledged	   that	  professional	  lessons	  of	  NATO’s	  arsenal	  management	  in	  battlefield	  are	  applicable	  across	  cases,	  especially	  the	   difficulties	   encountered	   in	   integrating	   conventional	   and	   nuclear	   deployment	   and	  employment	   plans.	   Deterrence	   rests	   on	   credibility,	   and	   credibility	   rests	   in	   part	   on	   the	  ability	   to	   deploy	   and	   employ	   a	   weapon	   system.	   Regardless	   of	   individual	   strategies	   or	  geostrategic	  contexts,	  all	  states	  considering	  the	  integration	  of	  TNW	  into	  their	  arsenals	  face	  difficult	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  placement,	  dispersal,	  and	  employment	  of	  these	  weapons—a	  lesson	  amply	  illustrated	  by	  the	  American	  Cold	  War	  experience.	  	  Participants	   recommended	   continued	   engagement	   on	   the	   four	   functional	   areas	   of	  command	   and	   control,	   doctrine,	   physical	   security,	   and	   personnel	   surety	   without	   the	  overarching	   organizational	   structure	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   experience.	   Pakistani	   participants	  indicated	  keenness	  in	  continuing	  to	  learn	  from	  Western	  experience	  and	  in	  further	  studying	  the	   revolution	   in	   military	   affairs	   (RMA)	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	   how	   the	   advent	   of	   smart	  munitions	  made	  TNW	  redundant.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Pakistani	  participants	  indicated	  that	  they	  are	  continuously	  analyzing	   the	   impact	  of	  TNW	  and	  are	  open	  to	  examining	  new	  ideas	  and	  their	  applicability	  for	  Pakistani	  strategic	  exigencies	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  environment.	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Pakistani	  battlefield	  nuclear	  weapon	  Nasr	   (Hatf-­‐IX)	  has	  a	  declared	  maximum	  range	  of	  60	  kilometers.	  The	  three	  sites	  for	  the	  Fulda	  Gap	  staff	  ride	  were	  selected	  to	  provide	  a	  discussion	  framework	  for	  the	  optimal	  employment	  and	  risks	  of	  Nasr	  deployments:	  at	  3	  kilometers,	  Pakistan	  would	  have	  the	  option	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  transborder	  employment;	  at	  20	  kilometers,	  Pakistan	  would	  have	  the	  option	  of	  employment	  across	  the	  border	  or	  on	  its	  own	  territory;	  and	  at	  35	  kilometers,	  Pakistan	  would	  be	  faced	  with	  employment	  on	  its	  own	  territory.	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I. Project	  Parameters	  	  
Objectives	  This	   dialogue	   is	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   professional	   engagement	   between	   former	   senior	  military	  officials	  and	  top	  security	  experts	  from	  Pakistan,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  previously	  held	  in	  September	  2012	  and	  May	  2013.	  This	  series	  of	  workshops	  has	  focused	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   introduction	   of	   short-­‐range	   nuclear	   weapons,	   also	  known	   as	   battlefield	   or	   tactical	   nuclear	   weapons	   (TNW)	   in	   South	   Asia.	   In	   this	   third	  iteration,	   workshop	   participants	   were	   expected	   to	   pick	   up	   the	   threads	   of	   previous	  iterations	  of	  this	  project	  and	  apply	  those	  discussions	  to	  analyze	  the	  strategic,	  operational,	  and	  tactical	  dynamics	  in	  Europe	  between	  NATO	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Participants	  also	  examined	   the	  applicability	  and	  relevancy	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  experience	   to	  South	  Asia.	  Workshop	  participants	  conducted	  a	   staff	   ride	  of	   the	  Fulda	  Gap,	  discussed	   the	  operational	   and	   tactical	   dimensions	   of	   the	   Inner	   German	   Border	   (IGB),	   and	   engaged	   in	  presentations	   and	   discussions	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   better	   understanding	   the	   implications	   of	  employment	   and	   deployment	   of	   battlefield	   nuclear	   weapons,	   the	   challenges	   military	  planners	  faced	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  what	  lessons	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  South	  Asia.	  	  
Event	  Outline	  Before	  the	  event,	  a	  concept	  paper	  that	  reconstructed	  the	  political,	  strategic,	  and	  operational	  realities	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  circulated.	  This	  paper	  also	  outlined	  the	  South	  Asian	  analogy	  and	  posed	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  for	  discussion	  during	  the	  event	  (see	  below).	  	  	  The	  event	  began	  with	  a	  strategic	  and	  operational	  overview	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  contextualize	  the	  conversation.	  This	  discussion	  was	  underscored	  through	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  Observation	  Point	  Alpha	  Memorial,	   a	   former	  NATO	  observation	  post.	   Point	  Alpha	  has	  been	  maintained	   and	  improved	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  is	  now	  a	  museum	  housing	  Cold	  War	  artifacts.	  Most	   importantly	   for	   our	   purposes,	   the	  museum	  presented	   several	  maps	   that	   illustrated	  the	   force	   structures	  of	  NATO	  and	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact.	   These	  maps	   also	  provided	   campaign	  plans	   that	   helped	   participants	  grasp	   how	   a	   Soviet	   invasion	  might	   have	   been	   conducted,	  which	  contextualized	  how	  TNW	  might	   or	   might	   not	   have	   been	  used	  in	  such	  an	  event.	  	  	  The	   second	   day	   began	   with	   a	  staff	  ride	  to	  three	  field	  sites	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  for	  map).	  The	  walks	  were	   led	  by	   a	   retired	  American	  general,	   who	   had	   served	   in	  Germany,	   and	  a	  British	  military	  historian,	   who	   had	   studied	  Soviet	   operational	   art	   in	   depth	  and	   had	   served	   on	   the	   Soviet	  team	   during	   NATO	   wargames	  
View	  from	  Site	  1,	  3	  km	  from	  the	  IGB,	  looking	  southeast	  towards	  the	  IGB.	  	  
Photo	  by	  Diana	  Wueger.	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throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  first	  site	  was	  located	  approximately	  3km	  from	  the	  border	  on	  a	  high	  point	  overlooking	  a	  valley	  and	  the	  town	  of	  Rasdorf.	  Site	  2	  was	  located	  approximately	  20km	  by	  road	  from	  the	  border,	  near	  Sargenzell.	  The	  third	  site	  was	  a	  further	  10km	  into	  the	  former	   West	   Germany	   from	   site	   2,	   at	   the	   crossing	   of	   the	   Fulda	   River,	   for	   a	   total	   of	  approximately	   35km	   of	   travel.	   Throughout	   the	   day,	   commentary	   was	   provided	   on	   the	  American	  and	  Soviet	  battle	  plans	  at	  each	  location.	  	  That	   afternoon,	  we	   concluded	  with	   a	   presentation	   by	   the	   Pakistani	   participants	   on	   their	  takeaways	   and	   lessons	   identified	   during	   the	   event.	   The	   Pakistani	   team	   presented	   their	  response	   to	   the	   staff	   ride	   and	   compared	   the	   Cold	  War	   operational	   picture	   to	   Pakistan’s	  situation.	  	  
Scope	  of	  Discussion	  The	  scope	  of	  discussions	  analogized	  between	   the	  U.S.	  Army’s	  Cold	  War	  experience	   in	   the	  Fulda	   Gap	   and	   Pakistani	   efforts	   to	   deter	   India.	   Drawing	   upon	   lessons	   of	   the	   previous	  sessions,	   this	  third	   iteration	  sought	  to	  elicit	  candid	  assessments	  of	  unexplored	  topics	  and	  unfinished	   discussions—particularly	   the	   battlefield	   utility	   of	   TNW	   and	   the	   assumptions	  about	  the	  perceived	  value	  of	  TNW	  as	  a	  deterrent.	  	  Several	  questions	   intended	  to	  guide	  participants’	   thinking	  were	  posed	  in	  a	  concept	  paper	  distributed	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  event.	  These	  questions	  also	  prompted	  participants	  to	  consider	  issues	   that	  had	  been	   insufficiently	  explored	   in	  previous	  workshop	   iterations.	  Participants	  were	  expected	  to	  deepen	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  experience	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  analogical	  reasoning	  to	  illuminate	  the	  challenges	  implicit	   in	  the	  adoption	  of	  TNW.	  We	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  answer	  these	  questions;	  rather,	  we	  hoped	  they	  would	  stimulate	  discussions	  and	  new	  ideas.	  	  	  
• Why	  did	  NATO	  initially	  develop	  and	  incorporate	  TNW	  into	  military	  plans?	  What	  was	  the	  NATO	  philosophy	  of	  deployment	  and	  employment?	  What	  did	  this	  imply	  in	  terms	  of	  training,	  doctrine,	  etc.	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  "warfighting"	  aspects	  of	  these	  systems	  sufficient	  to	  provide	  a	  significant	  deterrent	  value?	  
• What	   assumptions	   undergirded	   NATO	   military	   planning	   regarding	   TNW?	   Were	  these	  assumptions	  empirically	  accurate	  or	  correct?	  	  
• What	  role	  did	  perception	  and	  misperception	  play	  during	  the	  Cold	  War?	  
• What	   constituted	   deterrence	   failure	   for	   the	   Allies?	   Was	   any	   level	   of	   conflict	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  failure	  of	  deterrence,	  or	  did	  deterrence	  hold	  as	   long	  as	  nuclear	  weapons	  were	  not	  used?	  What	  were	  the	  implications	  of	  deterrence	  failure?2	  
• How	  did	  the	  Allies	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  visualize	  war	  termination?	  Could	  intra-­‐war	  deterrence—that	  is,	  a	  decision	  not	  to	  escalate	  beyond	  conventional	  weapons—have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 	  The	   workshop	   organizers	   understand	   that	   European	   or	   American	   Cold	   War	   conceptualizations	   of	  deterrence	   failure	   were	   not	   always	   aligned.	   For	   Europeans,	   the	   lowering	   of	   the	   nuclear	   threshold	   would	  increase	   the	   potential	   for	  American	   use	   of	   strategic	   nuclear	  weapons,	  which	  would	   deter	   the	   Soviets	   from	  attacking.	  For	  Americans,	  however,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  maintain	  a	  high	  threshold	  for	  deterrence	  failure;	  ideally,	  escalation	  to	  nuclear	  war	  with	  strategic	  systems	  would	  happen	  only	  after	  Europe	  had	  been	  overwhelmed	  or	  devastated	  by	  conventional	  systems,	  though	  this	  preference	  was	  not	  articulated	  or	  acknowledged	  in	  doctrine	  or	  policy.	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mitigated	   the	   problem	   of	   deterrence	   failure?	  Would	   escalation	   to	   tactical	   nuclear	  weapons	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  strategic	  nuclear	  exchanges?	  
• Had	   cyber	   attack	   capabilities	   existed	   in	   the	   1980s,	   how	   would	   they	   have	  complicated	  command	  and	  control	  and	  battlespace	  management	  for	  the	  Allies?	  How	  did	  the	  Allies	  intend	  to	  cope	  with	  electronic	  warfare?	  	  
• Deliberate	  signaling	  is	  intended	  to	  enhance	  deterrence,	  but	  in	  the	  fog	  of	  war,	  allies,	  third	   parties,	   and	   adversaries	   alike,	   especially	   if	   diplomatic	   channels	   have	   closed,	  can	  easily	  misinterpret	  signals	  involving	  nuclear	  threats.	  Furthermore,	  the	  potential	  for	  escalation	  dynamics	   to	  outrun	  signaling	  efforts	  was	  a	   constant	   concern	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  How	  did	  NATO	  think	  about	  its	  signaling	  capabilities,	  and	  how	  did	  its	  expect	   the	   Soviets	   to	   interpret	   or	   receive	   those	   signals?	   What	   mechanisms	   were	  expected	   to	   clarify	   these	   signals	   and	   communicate	   true	   intentions?	   For	   example,	  how	  could	  the	  signal	  be	  sent	  that	  dispersal	  of	  TNW	  was	  intended	  for	  weapon	  system	  survival	   rather	   than	   for	   offensive	   purposes?	   Conversely,	   how	   could	   the	   adversary	  have	  convincingly	  signaled	  that	  the	  mass	  movement	  of	  conventional	  forces	  was	  not	  intended	  for	  a	  full-­‐scale	  invasion?	  Furthermore,	  what	  did	  the	  movement	  of	  weapons	  suggest	  in	  terms	  of	  pre-­‐delegation	  of	  authority	  to	  employ	  weapons	  in	  response	  to	  a	  major	  Soviet	  breakthrough?	  
• What	  is	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  Central	  Front	  to	  the	  South	  Asian	  situation?	  Does	  the	  Fulda	  Gap	  metaphor	  apply	  when	  understood	  in	  its	  broader	  geostrategic	  context	  as	  well	  as	  in	  its	  specific	  tactical	  sense?	  	  
• What	  assumptions	  undergird	  Pakistani	  thinking	  about	  TNW?	  Are	  these	  assumptions	  correct?	  
• TNW	   in	   the	   South	  Asia	   context	   are	   understood	   to	   plug	   a	   tactical	   gap	   and	   thereby	  ensure	   full	   spectrum	   deterrence.	   How	   and	   under	  what	   conditions	  might	   TNW	   be	  employed	  in	  South	  Asia?	  If	  TNW	  are	  intended	  as	  a	  deterrent	  to	  commanders	  on	  the	  ground,	  what	  is	  the	  result	  when	  he	  is	  not	  deterred?	  
• How	  do	  the	  dilemmas	  described	  above	  present	   themselves	  (or	  not)	   in	  South	  Asia?	  How	  does	  Pakistan	  intend	  to	  manage	  or	  solve	  these	  dilemmas?	  	  	   	  
Discussion	  at	  Point	  Alpha	  Memorial	  Museum.	  	  Photo	  by	  Diana	  Wueger.	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II. The	  Cold	  War/South	  Asia	  Analogy:	  Geostrategic	  Dimensions	  	  
The	  Cold	  War	  at	  the	  Strategic	  Level	  	   At	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  Germany	  was	   occupied	   by	   four	   allied	   powers.	  The	   Soviet	   Union	   controlled	   eastern	  Germany	   up	   to	   the	   newly-­‐drawn	  Polish	   border,	   while	   the	   United	  States,	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	   France	  controlled	   the	   western	   regions.	   The	  capital,	  Berlin,	  was	  divided	   into	   four	  sectors	  as	  well.	  While	   it	  had	   initially	  been	   hoped	   that	   Germany	   could	   be	  governed	  as	  a	  single	  unit,	  these	  plans	  quickly	  broke	  down.	  As	  of	  1947,	   the	  American	   and	   British-­‐controlled	  zones	   had	   merged,	   and	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   had	   begun	   to	   implement	   its	  political-­‐economic	  system	  in	  the	  east.	  	  	  For	   the	   Russians,	   the	   extraction	   of	  reparations	   from	   Germany	   was	   of	  primary	   importance,	  while	   the	  Western	  powers	  prioritized	  economic	  reconstruction.	  The	  Berlin	   blockade	   of	   1948	   cemented	   the	   east-­‐west	   division	   of	   Germany.	   In	  May	   1949,	   the	  three	   western	   zones	   were	  merged	   to	   form	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   (FRG);	   the	  Soviets	  followed	  suit	  in	  October,	  creating	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic	  (GDR).	  	  	  During	   the	  mid-­‐	   to	   late-­‐1940s,	   there	  was	   a	   real	   fear	   among	   the	  Western	  European	   allies	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  intended	  to	  expand	  across	  Europe,	  driven	  by	  ideology	  and	  the	  desire	  to	   control	   the	   industrial	   heartland	   of	   Europe.	   Should	   the	   Soviets	   succeed	   in	   linking	   the	  resources	  of	  Western	  Europe	  to	  their	  own	  military	  capacity,	  they	  could	  prove	  the	  military	  and	   industrial	   equal	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   American	   nuclear	  monopoly	  was	   understood	   to	   provide	   the	   means	   by	   which,	   given	   enough	   time,	   any	   such	   invasion	  could	  eventually	  be	  rolled	  back	  from	  west	  to	  east,	  just	  as	  the	  Third	  Reich	  had	  been	  driven	  out	   of	   France.	   In	   the	   final	   analysis,	   the	   United	   States	   did	   not	   need	   to	   concern	   itself	  significantly	  with	  preventing	  an	  invasion	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  Europe	  prior	  to	  1949.	  	  	  After	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  American	  nuclear	  monopoly	  in	  1949,	  however,	  the	  western	  allies	  had	  to	  rethink	  their	  strategy	  for	  countering	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  They	  could	  no	  longer	  rely	  solely	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  ensure	  an	  ultimate	  victory,	  and	  the	  strategic	  problems	  presented	  by	  European	   geography	   came	   into	   sharp	   focus.	   Vital	   communication	   and	   industrial	   centers	  were	   perilously	   close	   to	   the	   Inner	  German	  Border	   and	   thus	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   rapid	   Soviet	  assault.	   France	   and	   England	   remained	   financially	   and	   militarily	   devastated,	   even	   with	  substantial	  American	  support.	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  allies	  would	  need	  German	  military	  forces	  to	  prevent	   the	  Soviets	   from	  overrunning	  Western	  Europe.	  West	  Germany	  could	  no	  
Occupation	   zone	   borders	   in	   Germany,	   1947.	   Divided	   Berlin	   is	   visible	   in	   the	  
Soviet-­‐controlled	  sector.	  Source:	  Wikimedia	  Commons.	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longer	   be	   treated	   as	   a	   buffer,	   and	   the	   effective	   defense	   of	   West	   Germany	   required	   the	  integration	   of	   West	   German	   conventional	   forces	   into	   the	   Allies’	   Central	   Front	   defensive	  effort.3	  The	  Washington	  Treaty,	  which	  established	   the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO),	   was	   signed	   in	   1949,	   and	   with	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   Paris	   Accords	   in	   1954,	   the	  occupation	   regime	   in	   West	   Germany	   ended.	   The	   FRG	   was	   admitted	   to	   NATO,	   and	   the	  German	   national	   army	   was	   reestablished	   and	   integrated	   into	   NATO,	   thus	   providing	   the	  Allies	   a	   way	   of	   exerting	   influence	   over	   German	   political	   and	   military	   developments.	   In	  response	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  NATO	  and	  to	  ensure	  Soviet	  control	  over	  the	  military	  forces	  of	  its	  Eastern	  European	  satellites,	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  was	  established	  in	  May	  of	  1955.	  	  
The	  Cold	  War	  at	  the	  Operational	  Level	  	   Throughout	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	  across	   Europe,	   there	   was	   a	  military	  and	  political	   imperative	  to	   counter	   the	   Soviets.	   The	  Southern	   Flank,	   stretching	  through	   the	   Mediterranean	   Sea,	  was	   a	   perennial	   source	   of	  tension;	   between	   1946	   and	  1989,	   approximately	   60	   armed	  conflicts	   and	   30	   coup	   attempts	  took	   place	   in	   the	   countries	  bordering	   the	   Mediterranean.	  The	   Northern	   Flank,	  encompassing	   the	   Scandinavian	  world	   of	   Denmark,	   Norway,	  Sweden,	   and	   Finland,	   was	  dominated	   by	   naval	   activity	   as	  American	   forces	   attempted	   to	  keep	   Soviet	   submarines	   bottled	  up	   in	   the	   Barents	   Sea	   lest	   they	  prey	  on	  Allied	  shipping.	   Indeed,	  there	  is	  some	  indication	  that	  the	  Soviets	   saw	   the	  Northern	   Flank	  as	  a	  central	  priority;	  if	  they	  could	  take	  Denmark,	  they	  could	  link	  their	  Northern	  and	  Baltic	  Fleets	  and	  they	  would	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  rear	  of	  NATO’s	  Central	  Front	  forces.	  Furthermore,	  had	   Denmark	   fallen,	   it	   could	   have	   had	   a	   domino	   effect,	   breaking	   off	   Norway,	   the	  Netherlands,	  and	  Belgium	  from	  the	  NATO	  core.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   it	   was	   the	   Central	   Front,	   most	   notably	   the	   standoff	   between	   the	   two	  Germanies,	   which	   posed	   the	   greatest	   complications	   for	   American	  military	   planners.	   The	  Central	   Front	   was	   the	   real	   prize	   worth	   capturing,	   offering	   the	   Soviets	   access	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  At	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  Germany’s	  military	  had	  been	  demobilized	  by	  the	  occupying	  forces.	  A	  significant	  challenge	   in	   the	   late	  1940s	  was	  how	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  responsible	  rearmament	  of	  Germany	  that	  would	  garner	  German	  public	  support	  without	  triggering	  opposition	  from	  France.	  	  
The	   Central	   Front:	  major	   formations.	   Source:	   Hugh	  Faringdon,	   Strategic	  Geography:	  
NATO,	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	   and	   the	   Superpowers,	   2nd	   ed.	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1989),	  
332.	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economic	   and	   military	   resources	   of	   Western	   Europe	   by	   way	   of	   the	   German	   plains.	   For	  political	  reasons,	  deterring	  Soviet	  aggression	  was	  paramount.	   If	  West	  Germany	  was	  to	  be	  kept	  securely	  in	  the	  western	  alliance,	  the	  alliance	  had	  to	  make	  the	  forward	  defense	  of	  West	  Germany	  the	  highest	  priority.	  There	  could	  be	  no	  reliance	  on	  strategic	  depth	  and	  maneuver	  to	  repel	  or	  blunt	  a	  Soviet	   invasion;	   the	  Soviets	  must	  be	  stopped	  at	   the	  border.	  The	   Inner	  German	  Border	   thus	   became	  one	   of	   the	  most	  militarized	   zones	   in	   the	  world;	   by	   the	   late	  1980s,	  NATO	  had	  around	  26	  divisions	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  57.	  	  	  A	   well-­‐defended	   border	   resulted	   in	  several	  operational	  dilemmas	  for	  the	  NATO	   forces.	   First,	   forward	   defense	  forfeited	   the	   principles	   of	   maneuver	  and	  depth	  to	  the	  political	  demand	  for	  a	   well-­‐defended	   border.	   Second,	  while	  the	  West’s	  intent	  in	  building	  up	  forces	  near	  the	  border	  was	  to	  deter	  a	  Soviet	   attack,	   its	   actions	   created	   a	  security	   dilemma,	   and	   the	   Soviets	  could	   never	   be	   sure	   that	   NATO’s	  forces	   were	   solely	   intended	   for	  defense. 4 	  Third,	   NATO’s	   second	  echelon	   forces	   were	   thin	   and	   supply	  chains	   stretched	   across	   the	   Atlantic,	  which	  would	  create	  problems	  for	  NATO	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.5	  	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  Soviet	  concept	  of	  operations	  entailed	  a	  “high	  rate	  of	  operations”	  that	  would	  rapidly	   destroy	  NATO’s	   defenses	   and	   allow	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact	   forces	   to	   seize	   deployment	  areas	  and	  overrun	  all	  weapons,	  including	  tactical	  nuclear	  missiles	  and	  artillery.	  They	  would	  then	  be	  able	  to	  either	  continue	  into	  Europe	  or	  hold	  fast	  and	  sue	  for	  peace.	  The	  Warsaw	  Pact	  forces	   would	   not	   have	   to	   travel	   far	   to	   gain	   the	   upper	   hand,	   politically	   or	   militarily.	  Moreover,	   25	   percent	   of	   West	   German	   industry	   and	   30	   percent	   of	   the	   population	   was	  within	  100	  kilometers	  of	  the	  border.	  Losing	  100	  kilometers	  would	  also	  cut	  communication	  with	   Denmark	   and	   the	   lower	   Danube	   valley.	   Another	   50	   kilometers	   and	  West	   Germany	  would	  be	  as	  good	  as	  lost;	  the	  Soviets	  would	  hold	  the	  Rhine,	  thereby	  cutting	  communication	  between	  NATO’s	   northern	   and	   southern	   army	   groups,	   and	   they	  would	   control	   the	   ports,	  airfields,	  and	  prepositioned	  stores	  along	  the	  Weser	  River.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Many	  Americans	  contest	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  perception	  based	  on	  the	  correlation	  of	  NATO	  and	  Warsaw	  forces.	  They	   argue	   that	   given	   the	   Soviets’	   overwhelming	   conventional	   dominance,	   they	   could	   not	   possibly	   have	  feared	  NATO	  aggression.	  This	  disconnect	  between	  real	  and	  perceived	   intentions	  and	  the	  display	  of	  military	  capability	   creates	   a	   signaling	   dilemma	  of	   intent	   versus	   capability.	   India	   and	  Pakistan	   face	   a	   similar	   intent-­‐capability	   paradox	   as	   brought	   to	   the	   fore	   in	   recently	   held	   crisis	   simulation	   exercises,	   which	   resulted	   in	  unintended	   escalation.	   Military	   planning	   is	   often	   based	   on	   worst-­‐case	   assumptions	   about	   the	   adversary’s	  capabilities	  and	  intentions,	  while	  assuming	  best-­‐case	  intentions	  for	  the	  self.	  	  	  5	  The	  bulk	  of	  NATO’s	  forces	  were	  not	  deployed	  on	  the	  front	  lines,	  but	  the	  capacity	  to	  operationally	  build	  up	  existed.	  	  
Signs	  at	  Observation	  Point	  Alpha.	  Vehicles	  were	  not	  allowed	  within	  50	  m	  
of	  the	  border.	  Photo	  by	  Diana	  Wueger.	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This	   compression	   of	   time	   and	   distance,	   then,	   incentivized	   the	  Allies’	   adoption	   of	   tactical	  nuclear	  weapons,	  which	  would	  ideally	  deter	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  invading.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  approximately	  5,000	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  of	  varying	  types	  acted	  as	  a	  force	  multiplier	  for	   NATO	   forces,	   even	   as	   the	   logic	   of	   deployment	   and	   employment	   was	   never	   fully	  explained	  in	  doctrinal	  terms	  that	  could	  be	  understood	  by	  either	  U.S.	  or	  Allied	  commanders.	  The	   development	   and	   deployment	   of	   tactical	   nuclear	  weapons	   by	   the	   United	   States	   also	  encouraged	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   to	   develop	   a	   similar	   arsenal,	   which	   included	   short-­‐range	  missiles	   as	   well	   as	   nuclear	   artillery.	   The	   Soviets	   believed	   that	   their	   possession	   of	   TNW	  would	  cause	  NATO	  to	  think	  twice	  about	  deciding	  to	  escalate.	  The	  very	  existence	  of	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  Central	  Europe	  posed	  a	  range	  of	  dilemmas	  that	  will	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  later	  in	  this	  paper.	  
Analogizing	  to	  South	  Asia	  	  As	   in	   the	   Cold	   War,	   the	   partition	   of	   India	   and	   Pakistan	   created	   a	   boundary	   that	   was	  fundamentally	   disconnected	   from	   geographic	   or	   strategic	   realities.	   Drawn	   primarily	   on	  ethno-­‐religious	  affiliations	  within	  districts,	  the	  Radcliffe	  Line	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  key	  features	   of	   the	   terrain	   such	   as	   rivers,	   mountains,	   or	   deserts.	   Instead,	   Partition	   created	  strategically	   problematic—in	   some	   places,	   nearly	   indefensible—corridors	   and	   contours	  that	   have	  plagued	  military	  planners	   ever	   since.	  Given	   the	   elongated	  nature	   of	   the	   state’s	  geography,	  Pakistan’s	  lines	  of	  communication	   from	  Karachi	  through	  Lahore	   to	   Islamabad	  run	   parallel	   and	   perilously	  close	   to	   the	   border	   and	  vulnerable	   to	   even	   a	   limited	  advance	   from	   India.	   Pakistan	  also	   has	   a	   second	  geostrategic	   challenge	   in	   the	  form	   of	   a	   turbulent	  Afghanistan	   border,	   which	  has	   created	   a	   two-­‐front	  problem	   for	   the	   army.	   Until	  1971,	   this	  was	   compounded	   by	   the	   additional	   challenge	   of	   having	   two	  wings—East	   and	  West	  Pakistan—separated	  by	  India.	  	  	  Pakistani	  defense	  planners	  have	  thus	  had	  to	  sacrifice	  maneuverability	  to	  an	   intensely	   felt	  political	  and	  military	  need	  to	  defend	  Pakistan’s	  borders	  against	  any	  incursion.	  As	  in	  West	  Germany,	   there	   are	   several	   possible	   corridors	   of	   approach	   that	   threaten	   Pakistan’s	  existence.	  Four	  avenues	  are	  particularly	  critical:	  north	  of	  Lahore,	  between	  the	  Chenab	  and	  Ravi	  Rivers;	  south	  of	  Lahore,	  between	  the	  Ravi	  and	  Beas/Sutlej	  Rivers;	  south	  of	  the	  Sutlej	  River;	   and	   via	   the	   Thar	   Desert/Rahim	   Yar	   Khan	   District.	   These	   sectors	   are	   not	   exact	  analogies	  to	  the	  Inner	  German	  Border	  situation,	  of	  course,	  but	   this	  strategic	  geography—overlaid	   with	   the	   threat	   of	   numerically	   larger	   conventional	   forces	   of	   India—formed	   the	  core	  of	  Pakistani	  defense	  thinking	  even	  before	  the	  advent	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  	  
Participants	  discuss	  escalation	  dynamics	  at	  Point	  Alpha	  Akademie.	  Photo	  by	  Diana	  Wueger.	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These	   vulnerabilities	   became	  more	   poignant	   after	   the	   1971	  War	   in	  which	   East	   Pakistan	  was	  lost,	  leaving	  a	  single	  front	  with	  India.	  After	  the	  first	  Indian	  nuclear	  test	  at	  Pokhran	  in	  1974,	  Pakistan	  began	  developing	  nascent	  nuclear	  capabilities,	  and	  the	  nuclear	  factor	  began	  to	   inject	   itself	   into	   this	   strategic	   and	   operational	   picture.	   Strategically,	   the	   Pakistan	  rationale	   for	  developing	  nuclear	  weapons	  was	   to	  offset	   the	  conventional	   force	   imbalance	  with	  India	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  1971;	  however,	  the	  problem	  was	  how	  to	  operationalize	  this	  concept.	  Self-­‐evidently,	  deterrence	  relies	  on	  both	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  capability	  as	  well	  as	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  that	  capability	  might	  be	  used	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  credibility.	  	  	  To	  mitigate	   its	   existential	   threats,	   Pakistan	  has	  developed	  a	   conventional	   strategy	   that	   it	  termed	  “offensive	  defense.”	  Offensive	  defense	  strategy	  bears	  some	  similarities	  to	  forward	  defense	  as	  it	  operated	  in	  Germany:	  the	  use	  of	  terrain	  obstacles	  as	  defensive	  positions;	  the	  building	  of	  garrisons	  near	  the	  border	  to	  allow	  for	  rapid	  mobilization;	  and	  the	  consideration	  of	  preemptive	  conventional	  attacks	  to	  take	  the	  battle	  into	  Indian	  territory	  and	  thus	  create	  space	  to	  maneuver.	  	  In	  the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐1980s,	  Indian	  military	  doctrine	  was	  reformed.	  Commonly	  referred	  as	  “Sunderji	  doctrine”	  (named	  after	  Indian	  General	  Krishnamurti	  Sunderji)	  and	  analogous	  to	  a	  blitzkrieg	   doctrine,	   in	   the	   event	   of	   military	   operations,	   India	   would	   punch	   through	  Pakistani	  defenses	  at	  the	  border	  and	  strike	  deep	  toward	  the	  Indus	  River	  to	  cut	  Pakistan	  in	  two.	  Echoing	  the	  Soviet	  concept	  of	  the	  “Operational	  Maneuver	  Group,”	  India	  reconfigured	  its	   offensive	   formations	   into	   Reinforced	   Army	   Plains	   Infantry	   Divisions	   (RAPID),	   which	  were	   coupled	   with	   mechanized	   forces	   and	   backed	   with	   air	   and	   artillery	   firepower.6	  Concurrently,	  Pakistan	  developed	  its	  counter	  military	  doctrine,	  which	  included	  riposte	  and	  counter	  offensive	  as	  essential	  components	  of	  its	  offensive	  defense	  strategy	  and	  its	  nuclear	  deterrent.	  The	  combination	  of	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  deterrents	  created	  new	  risks	  to	  the	  Indians	  should	  they	  opt	  for	  such	  an	  aggressive	  move.	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  1990s,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Pakistan’s	  experiences	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  uprising	  in	  Kashmir,	  Pakistan	  began	  to	  use	  sub-­‐national	   actors	   to	   divert	   Indian	   security	   forces’	   attention	   as	   well	   as	   to	   bolster	   the	  political	  struggle	  for	  Kashmiri	  freedom,	  which	  Pakistan	  have	  openly	  supported	  since	  1947.	  	  	  To	   the	   Indians,	   of	   course,	   Pakistan’s	   actions	   and	   strategies	   did	   not	   appear	   intended	   for	  defense.	  As	  with	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  NATO,	  perception,	  misperception,	  and	  the	  security	  dilemma	   created	   a	   sense	   that	   Pakistan	  may	   go	   on	   the	   offensive.	   India’s	   long,	   drawn-­‐out	  mobilization	  process	  against	  Pakistan’s	  shorter	  lines	  of	  communication	  for	  a	  conventional	  build	  up,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  advent	  of	  a	  nuclear	  deterrent,	  drove	  India	  to	  reconsider	  the	  Sunderji	  doctrine	  and	  created	  the	  rationale	  for	  a	  new	  concept	  of	  operations:	  limited	  war	  under	  the	  nuclear	   umbrella,	   otherwise	   known	   as	   “Cold	   Start”	   or	   “proactive	   operations.”	   Under	   the	  Cold	   Start,	   India	  would	   shorten	  mobilization	   times	   and	   create	   the	  potential	   to	   conduct	   a	  limited	  incursion	  into	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  escalation	  control	  and	  staying	  below	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  threshold.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	   Soviet	   "Operational	  Maneuver	   Group"	   concept	   of	   operations	   involved	   a	   large,	   heavily	   armored	   force	  supported	  by	  massive	  artillery	  that	  would	  exploit	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  its	  opponent's	  defenses.	  Soviet	  military	  journals	  in	  the	  1980s	  are	  replete	  with	  discussions	  of	  this	  as	  the	  doctrine	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  employ	  if	  it	  became	  involved	  in	  a	  war	  with	  NATO.	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Presented	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  Cold	  Start	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  ongoing	  domestic	  turbulence,	   the	  Pakistani	  response	  has	  been	  to	  develop	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons.	   Pakistani	   planners	   began	   to	   reevaluate	   the	   implications	   of	   Cold	   Start	   for	   their	  offensive-­‐defense	  strategy,	  which	  seemed	  ill	  equipped	  to	  cope	  with	  Cold	  Start;	  TNW	  would	  theoretically	   plug	   the	   gap	   and	   create	   a	   force	   multiplier	   effect	   for	   a	   thinly	   stretched	  Pakistani	   Army.	   With	   the	   introduction	   of	   TNW,	   Pakistan	   has	   asserted	   it	   is	   solving	   its	  problems	  just	  as	  NATO	  did	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  	   	  
Sketch	  of	  Pakistani	  geography	  and	  potential	  routes	  of	  attack	  into	  Pakistan.	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III. The	  Challenges	  of	  Short-­‐Range	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  	  	  There	   are	   numerous	   challenges	   inherent	   in	   the	   consideration	   of	   short-­‐range	   nuclear	  weapons.	  Many	  of	  these	  have	  been	  explored	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  in	  previous	  iterations	  of	  this	  workshop	   and	   others.7	  This	   is	   intended	   as	   a	   brief	   recap,	  with	   reference	   primarily	   to	  NATO’s	  experiences	  on	  the	  Central	  Front:	  
Security	  of	  Weapons	  Systems	  For	  NATO,	  guarding,	  maintaining,	  and	  moving	  TNW	  drew	  significant	  manpower	  away	  from	  other	   tasks—which	   was	   especially	   problematic	   when	   manpower	   was	   already	   at	   a	  premium.	   TNW	  were	   also	   potential	   targets	   for	   Soviet	   special	   forces	   (Spetznaz)	   and	   fifth	  column	   groups.	   This	   made	   the	   physical	   security	   of	   TNW	   of	   vital	   importance.	   While	  Pakistani	   participants	   downplayed	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   terrorist	   attack	   on	   a	  TNW	  storage	  site,	  recent	  terror	  attacks	  on	  military	  facilities	   in	  Pakistan	  suggest	  such	  a	  scenario	  cannot	  be	  dismissed	  out	  of	  hand.	  8	  	  The	  security	  of	  command	  and	  control	  networks	  also	  falls	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  field	  security.	  Networks	   that	   can	   transmit	   nuclear	   control	   orders	   regarding	   weapon	   repositioning,	  transfer	   of	   weapons	   to	   delivery	   units,	   and	   employment	   decisions	   must	   be	   reliable	   and	  hardened	  against	  any	  attacks.	  	  
Crisis	  Management	  Given	   the	   deep	   hostilities	   and	   threat	   perceptions	   on	   both	   sides,	   crisis	  management	  was	  crucially	   important	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Both	  NATO	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  were	  prone	  to	  ascribing	  malicious	  intent	  to	  their	  adversary,	  and	  both	  feared	  that	  crises	  could	  lead	  to	  rapid	  escalation	  to	  nuclear	  strikes	  with	  strategic	  systems.	  The	  presence	  of	  TNW	  only	  exacerbated	  tensions	   and	   undermined	   crisis	   management	   efforts.	   Had	   the	   Warsaw	   Pact	   forces	  perceived	   the	   movement	   of	   TNW	   from	   peacetime	   storage	   sites,	   they	   may	   have	   been	  inclined	  to	  launch	  preemptive	  conventional	  or	  nuclear	  attacks.	  The	  proximity	  of	  battlefield	  nuclear	  weapons	  raised	  the	  specter	  of	  sudden	  preemptive	  strikes	  before	  mechanized	  forces	  could	  unfold	  their	  operational	  plans.	  Similarly,	  India	  has	  indicated	  that	  removal	  of	  Pakistani	  TNW	  from	  their	   storage	  sites	  would	  be	  considered	  escalatory	  and,	   if	   they	  were	  detected,	  they	  would	  be	  considered	  legitimate	  targets	  for	  attacks.	  
Alert	  Times	  Even	   as	   intelligence,	   surveillance,	   and	   reconnaissance	   (ISR)	   capabilities	   improved	   and	  alerting	  mechanisms	  were	  developed,	  alert	  times	  were	  still	  low	  or	  unclear	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  a	  surprise	  attack	  remained.	  Without	  time	  to	  prepare	  for	  an	  incoming	  attack,	  a	  “use-­‐it-­‐or-­‐lose-­‐it”	  mentality	   could	   take	  over.	  Uncertainty	  over	   the	  arrival	  of	   reinforcements	  exacerbated	  this	  dynamic.	  The	  mobilization	  of	  forces	  in	  theater	  and	  the	  movement	  of	  additional	  Allied	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	   Feroz	   Khan,	   Ryan	   French,	   and	   Diana	  Wueger,	  Battlefield	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  and	  Deterrence	   Strategies:	  
Phase	  II	  (Monterey,	  CA:	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  2013);	  and	  Feroz	  Khan,	  and	  Alfred	  Woodson,	  Battlefield	  
Nuclear	  Weapons	  and	  Deterrence	  Strategies	  (Monterey,	  CA:	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  2012).	  8 	  See	   Feroz	   Khan,	   and	   Emily	   Burke,	   Managing	   Strategic	   Crises	   in	   South	   Asia	   (Monterey,	   CA:	   Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  2014);	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forces	  to	  the	  central	  region	  was	  a	  political	  decision.	  During	  a	  crisis,	  civilian	  leaders	  would	  be	  concerned	  that	  such	  a	  move	  could	  risk	  miscalculation,	  misperception,	  and	  escalation.	  
Movement	  from	  Peacetime	  Storage	  	  The	  Warsaw	  Pact	  watched	  weapon	  storage	  sites	  for	  signs	  that	  NATO	  had	  decided	  to	  move	  its	   tactical	  nuclear	   stockpile	   from	  peacetime	   fixed	  storage	   locations	   to	   field	   storage	   sites,	  which	  was	   the	   final	   step	  before	   transfer	   to	  delivery	  units.	  Had	  NATO	  made	   any	   effort	   to	  move	  weapons	  forward	  to	  field	  storage	  sites,	  it	  could	  have	  exacerbated	  an	  existing	  crisis.	  If	  the	  Soviets	  had	  struck	  a	  NATO	  TNW	  storage	   location	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  a	  crisis,	  NATO	  would	   have	   moved	   its	   TNW	   from	   peacetime	   storage	   sites	   to	   rear	   operational	   areas	   for	  survivability;	   had	   they	   not	   been	   moved,	   they	   could	   have	   been	   lost.	   However,	   their	  movement	   would	   have	   been	   seen	   by	   the	   Warsaw	   Pact	   and	   could	   have	   triggered	   a	  preemptive	   strike.	   In	   the	   South	   Asian	   context,	   if	   Pakistan	  moves	   its	   TNW	   from	   storage,	  India	  has	  indicated	  that	  it	  will	  view	  this	  as	  an	  escalatory	  move.	  Even	  if	  the	  Pakistani	  intent	  is	  to	  ensure	  survivability,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  the	  Indian	  side	  to	  know	  that	  definitively.	  	  
Force	  Positioning	  and	  Reinforcement	  during	  Crisis	  Had	   the	  decision	   to	  move	  TNW	   from	   storage	  during	   a	   crisis	  been	   taken	  by	  NATO	  or	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	   the	  physical	  movement	  of	  weapons	   systems	   to	   the	   correct	  locations	   and	   units	   would	   have	   been	   a	  challenge	   in	   itself.	   Limited	   road	  networks	   leading	   to	   the	   Central	   Front	  would	   have	   complicated	   the	   effort	   to	  reinforce	   the	   border	   and	   get	   TNW	   into	  positions.	   Furthermore,	   military	  planners	   assumed	   away	   the	   possibility	  that	   refugee	   flows	   would	   choke	   the	  roads;	   to	   simplify	   planning,	   they	  assumed	   that	   civilians	   would	   stay	   in	  place	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   crisis	   and	   that	  roads	  would	  remain	  useable	  and	  free	  of	  refugees	  fleeing	  the	  front.	  	  
Battlespace	  Management	  	  The	  integration	  of	  nuclear	  and	  conventional	  force	  plans	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  challenge	  for	  U.S.	   forces	   in	  Germany.	  Models	   for	  the	  employment	  of	   tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  relied	  on	  radiation	  effects	  to	  determine	  the	  size	  and	  number	  of	  weapons	  to	  be	  employed	  against	  a	  target.	  The	  physical	   impacts	  of	  TNW	  were	  poorly	   incorporated	  into	  military	  planning;	   for	  example,	   the	   full	   effect	   of	   fires	   and	   electromagnetic	   pulse	   (EMP)	   were	   not	   accurately	  depicted	   by	   the	  models.	   Additionally,	   it	  was	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   predict	   how	   a	   nuclear	  blast	  would	  alter	  the	  physical	  and	  human	  terrain	  and	  thus	  which	  conventional	  assets	  would	  be	  most	  useful	  afterwards.	  This	  complicated	  calculations	  of	  how	  the	  employment	  of	  such	  weapons	  could	  be	  done	  in	  concert	  with	  ground	  maneuver	  in	  order	  to	  reestablish	  the	  “status	  quo	   ante”	   after	   a	   Soviet/Warsaw	   Pact	   attack.	   In	   short,	   the	   presence	   of	   TNWs	   made	  conventional	  operational	  plans	  much	  more	  complicated	  and	  their	  integration	  created	  more	  questions	  that	  remained	  unanswered	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
Studying	  maps	  at	  Point	  Alpha	  Memorial	  Museum.	  Photo	  by	  Diana	  Wueger.	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Command	  and	  Control	  NATO	  assumed	  command	  and	  control	  would	  remain	  in	  place	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  crisis	  because	  without	   command	   and	   control	   (C2)	   the	   logic	   of	   deterrence	   via	   TNW	   broke	   down.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  assumption	  of	  robust	  C2	  was	  more	  of	  a	  hope	  than	  a	  fact;	  there	  were	  any	  numbers	   of	   mechanisms	   by	   which	   communications	   could	   have	   broken	   down,	   including	  special	  operations	  attacks,	  destruction	  by	  fire,	  and	  electronic	  warfare.	  Furthermore,	  Soviet	  planners	  would	  have	  likely	  assumed	  that	  the	  movement	  of	  weapons	  from	  their	  peacetime	  storage	   locations	   indicated	   that	  NATO	  political	   leaders	   had	   transferred	   authority	   for	   the	  employment	  of	  TNW	  to	  military	  commanders.	  	  	  In	   the	   Pakistani	   case,	   the	   C2	   channel	   for	   nuclear	   weapons	   is	   distinct	   from	   conventional	  force	   commands.	   Nuclear	   forces	   are	   not	   under	   command	   of	   the	   conventional	   corps	   and	  division	   commanders,	   though	   especially	   the	   TNW	  would	   be	   operating	   in	   those	   areas	   of	  responsibility.	   Furthermore,	   Pakistan	   has	   made	   it	   known	   that	   the	   centralized	   command	  and	  control	  would	  remain	  so	  under	  all	  circumstances	  and	  no	  pre-­‐delegation	  is	  planned.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  breakdown	  of	  communication	  and	  absence	  of	  robust	  ISR	  would	  put	  Pakistani	  command,	  control,	  communications,	  and	  intelligence	  (C3I)	  system	  under	  severe	  stress	  and	  possible	  breakdown	  in	  some	  if	  not	  all	  sectors.	  	  	   	  
Map	  at	  Point	  Alpha	  Memorial	  Museum	  explaining	  the	  operational	  plans	  and	  major	  force	  movements	  in	  the	  Fulda	  Gap	  area.	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  by	  Diana	  Wueger.	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IV. After	  Fulda:	  The	  Analogy	  Revisited	  	  Throughout	   the	  workshop,	   one	   of	   the	  most	   challenging	   elements	   for	   both	   sides	  was	   the	  persistent	   lack	   of	   clarity	   over	   when	   and	  where	   exactly	   the	   Americans	   would	   have	   used	  their	  TNW	  in	   the	  event	  of	  a	  Warsaw	  Pact	   invasion.	  During	   the	  staff	   ride,	   the	  answer	  was	  repeatedly,	  “not	  here”	  and	  “not	  yet.”	  The	  American	  team	  suggested	  it	  was	  entirely	  possible	  that	  TNW	  would	  never	  have	  been	  used,	  given	  the	  difficulties	  in	  achieving	  release	  authority	  and	   then	  moving	   the	  weapons	   into	  position.	  While	  doctrinally	  TNW	  were	   integrated	   into	  American	  plans,	   in	  practice	  the	  potential	   for	  their	  use	  would	  have	  been	  an	  open	  question	  that	  could	  not	  be	  answered	  satisfactorily	  during	  this	  workshop.	  One	  Pakistani	  participant	  asked	   whether	   NATO	   would	   have	   viewed	   the	   destruction	   of	   nuclear-­‐armed	   systems	   as	  escalatory	   and	   seemed	   surprised	   when	   the	   answer	   was	   no.	   Because	   all	   TNW	  would	   be	  flushed	  from	  peacetime	  storage	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  crisis,	  NATO	  would	  have	  viewed	  this	  as	  a	  simple	   casualty	   of	   war	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   deliberate	   attempt	   to	   degrade	   NATO’s	   nuclear	  capabilities.9	  	  Both	  sides	  found	  it	  particularly	  enlightening	  to	  learn	  of	  Soviet	  doctrines	  and	  plans	  for	  the	  Central	   Front.	   One	   participant,	   an	   expert	   on	   Soviet	   military	   doctrine,	   explained	   that	   in	  Soviet	   thought,	   the	   Fulda	   Gap	   and	   the	   southern	   areas	   of	   the	   Central	   Front	  were	   not	   the	  ideal	  points	  of	  invasion.	  Rather,	  the	  primary	  offensive	  would	  have	  been	  across	  the	  northern	  plains	  of	  Germany,	  where	  the	  terrain	  was	  flatter	  and	  the	  forces	  on	  the	  ground	  were	  thinner	  and	   less	   prepared.	   The	   areas	   controlled	   by	   the	   U.S.	   V	   and	   VII	   Corps	  would	   have	   been	   a	  holding	  force	  to	  keep	  the	  Americans	  from	  aiding	  their	   allies	   in	   the	   north.	   At	   the	   nuclear	   level,	  Soviet	  doctrine	  called	  for	  30	  percent	  of	  available	  TNW	   to	   be	   forward	   deployed	   at	   all	   times	   and	  ready	   for	   immediate	  use.	   If	   it	  should	  seem	  that	  NATO	  was	  preparing	  to	  go	  from	  conventional	  to	  nuclear,	   Soviet	   doctrine	   demanded	   a	  preemptive	  strike	  that	  would	  include	  the	  use	  of	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  available	  TNW.	  	  	  By	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Day	   2,	   the	   Pakistani	  participants	   had	   comprehended	   NATO	  deployment	   dilemma	   and	   began	   to	   draw	  analogies	   and	   differences	  with	   the	   operational	  conditions	  that	  applied	  to	  the	  Fulda	  Gap	  region.	  They	  explained	  that	  Pakistan	  did	  not	  have	  the	   luxury	   of	   giving	   30–50km	  of	   territory,	   before	   resorting	   to	   TNW;	   they	  must	   stop	   any	  Indian	  incursion	  at	  the	  border	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  both	  national	  pride	  and	  military	  necessity.	  In	  terms	  of	  time	  and	  space	  the	  Pakistani	  team	  suggested	  that	  some	  degree	  of	  territorial	   loss	  was	   possible	   only	   in	   the	   desert	   sector	   where	   they	   could	   absorb	   advancing	   and	  maneuvering	   Indian	  mechanized	   forces,	  but	  not	  around	  Lahore	  and	   in	  other	  areas	  where	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  There	  were	  divergent	  views	  amongst	   the	  Pakistanis	  on	   the	  escalatory	  prospects	  of	  nuclear	  weapon	  being	  targeted	   in	   the	   battlefield.	   Views	   of	   some	   Pakistani	   generals	   were	   congruous	   to	   NATO’s	   thinking.	   In	   the	  Istanbul	  Table	  Top	  Exercise,	  loss	  of	  TNW	  in	  the	  battlefield	  or	  destruction	  of	  weapon	  system	  in	  the	  course	  of	  war	  was	  taken	  as	  expected	  casualties	  in	  the	  battlefield.	  	  	  
Discussion	  at	  Site	  3,	  on	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  Photo	  by	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loss	  of	   territory	  was	  not	  permissible.	  One	  senior	  Pakistani	  participant	  said	   that	  TNW	  are	  “an	  insurance	  guarantee	  against	  surprise”	  and	  a	  guarantee	  at	  the	  operational	   level,	  not	  at	  the	  national	  or	  strategic	  levels.	  TNW	  would	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  time	  against	  a	  strategic	  defeat	  and	  to	  regain	  momentum	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  	  
Nuclear	  Romanticism	  Pakistani	   participants	   argued	   they	   have	   reached	   a	   new	  maturity	   with	   regard	   to	   nuclear	  weapons,	   but	   were	   still	   unable	   to	   convince	   the	   American	   delegation	   that	   they	   had	   a	  doctrine	   to	   govern	   TNW	   deployment	   and	   employment.	   One	   participant	   suggested	   that	  Pakistan	   remains	   in	   the	   throes	   of	   “nuclear	   romanticism,”	   or	   the	   belief	   that	   conventional	  force	   imbalances	   can	   be	   offset	   through	   nuclear	  weapons,	   but	   that	   this	   did	   not	   pose	   any	  great	  danger	  to	  security	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	  	  	  American	  participants	  emphasized	  the	  evolutionary	  nature	  of	  TNWs	  in	  American	  thinking,	  though	  British	  colleagues	  cautioned	  against	  the	  tendency	  towards	  imposing	  retrospective	  coherence	  on	  what	  was	  a	  relatively	  non-­‐linear,	  capricious	  process.	  During	  the	  early	  nuclear	  euphoria	  of	   the	  1950s	  and	  60s,	  TNWs	  were	  considered	  a	  reasonable	   investment	  with	  the	  costs	   offset	   by	   the	   political	   value	   gained.	  However,	   as	   the	   systems	   began	   arriving	   in	   the	  field,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  their	  value	  as	  either	  a	  deterrent	  or	  a	  warfighting	  instrument	  was	  minimal	  compared	  to	  the	  costs	  imposed	  by	  their	  presence.	  	  	  The	  revolution	  in	  military	  affairs	  (RMA)	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  helped	  NATO	  escape	  the	  logical	  and	  logistical	  trap	  of	  TNW.	  A	  series	  of	  initiatives	  to	  gain	  synergies	  between	  systems,	  the	   RMA	   of	   the	   1980s	   improved	   NATO’s	   ISR	   and	   communications	   capabilities.	   The	  development	  of	  precision	  guided	  munitions	   (PGMs),	  dual-­‐capable	   improved	  conventional	  munitions	   (DCICMs),	   and	   other	   systems	   that	   could	   provide	   equivalent	   or	   better	  military	  effects	  than	  TNW	  led	  to	  the	  de-­‐emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  for	  a	  battlefield	  nuclear	  response.	  The	  idea	   of	   using	  TNW	  became	   increasingly	   archaic,	   and	   it	   became	   increasingly	   obvious	   that	  TNW	  had	  been	  obviated	  by	  conventional	  systems.	  	  The	  Pakistani	  participants	  wondered	  if	  such	  conventional	  technologies	  that	  might	  replace	  TNW	   were	   within	   their	   technological	   and	   financial	   reach,	   saying	   that	   technological	  progress	   has	   made	   unviable	   the	   types	   of	   systems	   the	   U.S.	   had	   adopted.	   In	   their	   view,	  Pakistan	  could	  not	  afford	  the	  modernized	  versions	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  generate	  a	  similar	  deterrent	  effect	  against	  India.	  That	  said,	  they	  acknowledged	  they	  could	  do	  a	  more	  thorough	  systems	  analysis	  to	  determine	  what	  conventional	  capabilities	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	   do	   what	   TNW	   are	   intended	   to	   do.	   They	   suggested	   that	   TNW	   are	   a	   cheap	   option	   for	  deterrence,	   though	   they	  did	   not	   seem	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   opportunity	   costs	   imposed	  by	  TNW.	   One	   American	   participant	   suggested	   several	   areas	   in	   which	   minor	   investments	  would	   generate	   significant	   improvements	   in	   Pakistan’s	   conventional	   force	   position,	  including	   improving	   command	   and	   control	   systems,	   reorganizing	   General	   Headquarters	  (GHQ),	   and	   improving	   joint	   operations	   between	   the	   Pakistan	  Army	   and	   the	   Pakistan	  Air	  Force.	   The	   improvement	   of	   Pakistan’s	   intelligence	   organization,	   including	   better	   human	  capital,	   reorganization,	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   tactical	   fusion	   centers,	   would	   also	   pay	  significant	  dividends.	  	  
18	  	  |	  	  Battlefield	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  and	  Deterrence	  Strategies:	  Phase	  III	  
American	   participants	   also	   emphasized	   that	   longer-­‐range	   theater	   systems	   could	   provide	  more	   flexibility	   by	   allowing	   for	   overlap	   of	   coverage	   areas.	   This	   would	   also	   keep	   the	  weapons	   safer,	   as	   they	  would	  be	   further	   from	   the	  border	   and	   thus	   less	   vulnerable	   to	   an	  advancing	  Indian	  column.	  Pakistani	  participants	  discounted	  this,	  saying	  this	  would	  result	  in	  larger	  weapons	  that	  would	  not	  be	  as	  agile	  and	  could	  not	  shoot	  and	  scoot.	  There	  is	  the	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  sunk	  costs	  for	  Pakistan;	  Pakistan	  has	  invested	  heavily	  in	  the	  production	  of	  its	  TNW	   systems	   and	   are	   understandably	   reluctant	   to	   let	   them	   go	   before	   their	   operational	  lifespan	  is	  complete.	  
Salient	  Differences	  Through	  this	  workshop,	  several	  key	  differences	  between	  South	  Asia	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  were	  identified,	   both	   the	   obvious	   and	   the	   less	   so.	   Clearly,	   the	   geostrategic	   situations,	   terrain,	  military	   compositions,	   and	   technological	   advancement	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   are	   not	   exact	  parallels,	   though	   these	  are	  generally	   tactical-­‐level	  details.	  At	   the	   strategic	   level,	  however,	  Cold	  War	   actors	   did	   not	   face	   nearly	   as	   complex	   and	   active	   a	   sub-­‐national	   actor	   problem	  that	  South	  Asian	  nations	  must	  cope	  with,10	  nor	  was	  the	  problem	  of	  cyber	  warfare	  nearly	  as	  acute	  as	  it	  is	  today.	  	  	  Most	  significantly,	  the	  role	  of	  alliance	  politics	  in	  the	  nuclear	  dimensions	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  been	  underplayed.	  Unlike	  Pakistan,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  free	  to	  decide	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons,	  including	   tactical	   nuclear	   weapons,	   because	   it	   had	   to	   seek	   allies’	   approval.	   A	   process	   of	  requests	  for	  authorization	  would	  have	  to	  be	  followed	  before	  authorization	  for	  use	  would	  be	  granted.	  American	   field	  commanders	  assumed	  that	  any	  request	   they	  might	  submit	  would	  take	  several	  days	  for	  authorization,	  by	  which	  point	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  TNW	  would	  be	  in	  any	  position	  to	  affect	  the	  unfolding	  battle.	  Furthermore,	  once	  the	  authorization	  for	  release	  was	  granted,	  there	  was	  a	  complicated	  system	  of	  movement	  from	  peacetime	  storage	  to	  field	  storage	  to	  emplacement	  for	  battle.	  By	  contrast,	  Pakistan	  has	  unilateral	  authority	  to	  use	  its	  nuclear	   weapons	   and	   does	   not	   have	   an	   intermediate	   storage	   site	   system.	   While	   this	  simplifies	  the	  command	  and	  control	  issues	  significantly,	  it	  also	  makes	  the	  removal	  of	  TNW	  from	  storage	  even	  more	  threatening	  and	  escalatory.	  	  	  Another	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  U.S.	  experience	  and	  Pakistan’s	  concept	  for	  use	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whose	  territory	  is	  affected	  by	  nuclear	  use.	  The	  U.S.	  would	  have	  been	  using	  nuclear	  weapons	  on	  German	  soil,	  which	  would	  carry	  less	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  baggage	  than	  use	  on	  American	  soil.	  Pakistani	  participants	   recognized	   that	   the	  German	  public	  was	  vocally	  opposed	  to	  nuclear	  use,	  which	  constrained	  American	  plans.	  The	  Pakistani	  public,	  by	  contrast,	  has	  been	  neutral	  or	  silent;	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  they	  simply	  have	  not	  considered	  this	  possibility.	  While	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  workshop,	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   and	  public	  opinion	  in	  constraining	  military	  and	  political	  actors	  is	  worthy	  of	  additional	  attention.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Though	  Europe	  did	  not	  face	  the	  same	  level	  of	  terrorist	  threat	  as	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  South	  Asia,	  NATO	  faced	  problems	   with	   the	   Bader	   Meinhof	   Gang	   and	   Red	   Army	   factions,	   which	   once	   attempted	   to	   break	   into	   the	  Giessen	   nuclear	   storage	   site.	   Furthermore,	   declassified	   documents	   reveal	   there	   were	   real	   concerns	   that	  during	  a	   crisis	   the	  East	  Germans	  were	  prepared	   to	   incite	  dissension	  amongst	   the	  West	  German	  population	  and	  to	  conduct	  attacks	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  “terrorists.”	  Finally,	  during	  a	  crisis,	  it	  was	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviets	  might	  employ	  special	  operations	  attacks	  against	  NATO’s	  tactical	  nuclear	  sites.	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V. Conclusion	  	  Several	  participants	  expressed	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  experience,	  though	  not	  a	  perfect	  analogy	  for	  South	  Asia,	  still	  contained	  many	  applicable	  lessons.	  Among	  the	  differences,	  Cold	  War	  actors	  did	  not	  face	  nearly	  as	  complex	  and	  active	  a	  sub-­‐national	  actor	  problem	  as	  that	  with	  which	  that	  South	  Asian	  states	  are	  coping.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  information	  age,	  cyber	  warfare	  is	  much	  acute	  than	  was	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  past	  and	  hold	  tremendous	  promise	  for	  a	  complicated	   battle	   environment	   that	   has	   changed	   the	   nature	   of	   future	   warfare.	  Nevertheless,	   deterrence	   credibility	   rests	   in	   part	   on	   the	   ability	   to	   deploy	   and	   employ	   a	  weapon	   system.	   Regardless	   of	   individual	   strategies	   or	   geostrategic	   contexts,	   all	   states	  considering	  the	  integration	  of	  TNW	  into	  their	  arsenals	  face	  difficult	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  placement,	  dispersal,	  and	  employment	  of	  these	  weapons—a	  lesson	  amply	  illustrated	  by	  the	  American	  Cold	  War	  experience.	  	  	  Participants	   were	   also	   keen	   on	   continued	   conversation	   about	   the	   functional	   challenges	  inherent	  in	  managing	  nuclear	  arsenals.	  The	  U.S.	  experience	  in	  Germany	  may	  be	  sui	  generis,	  but	   the	   U.S.	   experience	   with	   arsenal	   management	   is	   applicable	   across	   cases.	   Some	  participants	   recommended	   continued	   engagement	   on	   the	   four	   functional	   areas	   of	  command	   and	   control,	   doctrine,	   physical	   security,	   and	   personnel	   surety,	   without	   the	  overarching	  organizational	  structure	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  experience.	  	  	  There	  was	  also	  interest	  in	  deeper	  discussions	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  the	  RMA	  of	  the	  1980s	   provided	   a	   better	   solution	   for	   a	   lower	   cost	   to	   manpower,	   budgets,	   and	   logistical	  burden.	   The	   Pakistani	   participants	   were	   initially	   skeptical	   that	   the	   conventional	  technological	  improvements	  required	  to	  deter	  an	  Indian	  Army	  equipped	  with	  21st	  century	  armaments	  would	  be	  affordable.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  participants	   indicated	  keen	  interest	   in	  continuing	  to	  learn	  and	  further	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  RMA	  on	  the	  battlefield	  environment.	  Of	   particular	   interest	   was	   how	   the	   advent	   of	   smart	   munitions	   made	   TNW	   redundant.	  Though	  the	  Pakistani	  participants	  were	  non-­‐committal	  and	  shy	  of	  labeling	  their	  interest	  in	  examining	  “substitutes”	  to	  the	  TNW,	  they	  implied	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  this	  history	  and	  the	   future	   application	   of	   smart	  munitions	   could	   provide	   complementary	   variety	   and	   the	  flexibility	   to	   mitigate	   the	   deployment	  and	  employment	  disadvantages	  of	  TNW.	  	  	  Pakistani	   participants	   noted	   that	  analysis	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  TNW	  is	  an	  ongoing	   process	   in	   Pakistan.	   If	   India	  puts	   garrisons	   on	   the	   border	   under	   a	  Cold	   Start	   concept,	   and	   Pakistan	  responds	   by	   garrisoning	   its	   forces	  forward,	  South	  Asia	  could	  end	  up	  with	  a	  border	   like	   that	   of	   the	   Inner	   German	  border—heavily	  militarized	  and	  replete	  with	   low-­‐yield	   nuclear	   weapons,	   yet	  unable	   to	   resolve	   the	   dilemmas	   and	  dangers	  posed	  by	  such	  weapons.	  	   	  
OP	  Alpha	   as	   seen	   from	   the	   East	  German	   side	   of	   the	   border.	   Photo	   by	  
Diana	  Wueger.	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Appendix:	  Maps	  
Map	  1:	  Annotated	  Fulda	  Gap	  Staff	  Ride	  Sites	  
	  	  	   	  
Fulda Gap Staff Ride
Field Sites
Start: Former IGB, Point Alpha
Site 1: 3km from IGB, Rasdorf
Site 2: 20km from IGB,
Sargenzell
Site 3: 30km from IGB, Fulda
River
Other Points of Note
Frankfurt, ~130km from IGB
Portion of Inner-German Border
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Map	  2:	  Inner	  German	  Border	  
	  	  	  Source:	  Faringdon,	  Strategic	  Geography,	  352. 
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Map	  3:	  Pakistan:	  Major	  Cities	  and	  Lines	  of	  Communication	   	  
Source:	  CIA.gov	  
	   Battlefield	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  and	  Deterrence	  Strategies:	  Phase	  III	  	  |	  	  23	  
	  
Map	  4:	  Pakistan:	  Physiography	  	   	  
	  
Source:	  CIA.gov	  

